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THE RETURN OF GREAT-POWER COMPETITION
Cold War Lessons about Strategic Antisubmarine Warfare and 
Defense of Sea Lines of Communication
Bradford Dismukes
Great-power competition, not terrorism, is now the primary focus of 
U.S. national security.
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JAMES N. MATTIS, 19 JANUARY 2018
 These words of Secretary Mattis are momentous.1 Great-power competition is recognized widely as having been the root cause of the First World War, a 
powerful contributor to the Second World War, and a core element of the Cold 
War.2 Mr. Mattis raises the serious possibility that war with a major opponent lies 
on the horizon. Such a war might be fought for major, even existential, stakes; but 
smaller, indecisive wars among the great powers also could occur, as was the case 
during earlier centuries in Europe.3 
An immediate, tangible expression of the new orientation was the reestablish-
ment of the U.S. Navy’s Second Fleet. When Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) 
Admiral John M. Richardson made the announcement in May 2018, he justified 
the need for the fleet as a response to great-power competition, specifically with 
Russia.4 The fleet’s area of responsibility (AOR) centers on the North Atlantic 
Ocean, whose Cold War lessons from history include the importance of stra-
tegic antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and defense of sea lines of communication 
(SLOCs). These would have constituted two of the original Second Fleet’s three 
principal strategic missions had there been a war with the Soviet Union.5 Strategic 
ASW meant attacking Soviet ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs) to affect the 
superpower nuclear balance; defending SLOCs is a particular form of sea control, 
defined as being able to use the sea when, where, and for the purposes desired. In 
this case, defending SLOCs meant protecting shipping between North America 
and Europe—where unimpeded passage was a sine qua non for the Western 
alliance to succeed in war at the conventional level. Strategic ASW arrived on 
the scene in the mid-1980s; SLOC defense long had been a fixture of U.S. naval 
strategy, born of the searing experience of two world wars and from geostrategic 
2
Naval War College Review, Vol. 73 [2020], No. 3, Art. 6
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss3/6
 3 4  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
theories dating at least from the first half of the twentieth century.6 SLOC defense 
has been the most enduring single construct in the Navy’s strategic thinking, 
always in the back of the planner’s mind—a kind of default position; as will be 
seen, even strategic ASW was put to its service.
The immediate aim of this article is to contribute to the historical under-
standing of intelligence and planning during the Cold War. The larger aim 
is to draw lessons that may be useful for Navy planning in the new world of 
great-power competition. (Readers whose main interest is less in the history 
of the Cold War are invited to fast-forward to the sections following “Lessons 
for Today.”)
The Cold War is viewed, properly, as a historic success. Yet, paradoxically, sev-
eral of the lessons drawn from the Navy’s experience during it are negative ones— 
namely, what to avoid. That is because Cold War planning for both strategic ASW 
and SLOC defense experienced important failures, first in strategic intelligence, 
then in the way planners used that intelligence. Intelligence errors centered on 
varying levels of success in understanding Soviet strategic intentions—incorrectly, 
in the case of SLOCs, and too slowly, in the case of strategic ASW. Planning errors 
involved a failure to draw a bright line between the adversary that intelligence 
identified, as realistically as possible, and the one the planner contrived to fight. 
Planners carry multiple responsibilities—not all of which are related to the ad-
versary. The first is to defend their own vulnerabilities, regardless of the strategic 
intentions imputed to the adversary. Planners also are responsible for promoting 
alliance solidarity and protecting Navy interests in interservice competition for 
the defense budget.7 The crucial nexus between intelligence and planning will be 
examined in the concluding sections.
Any effort to understand the Navy’s Cold War history must start with these 
two historically intertwined intelligence failures. In the case of strategic ASW, 
the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) ultimately was correct. But well over eight 
years elapsed between (1) 1973, when the Soviets assigned their SSBNs a critical 
role in their war plans, and simultaneously assigned their general-purpose-force 
(GPF) navy the mission of defending those SSBNs in sea bastions; and (2) the 
early 1980s, when the IC properly recognized those roles. Shortly after that, Navy 
planners responded with the Maritime Strategy, publicly announced in 1986.8 But 
before the Maritime Strategy (i.e., between [1] and [2]), naval planning experi-
enced approximately a decade of lost opportunity and misdirected effort.
This lengthy, if little recognized, intelligence failure was linked to a larger 
one. Intelligence about the SLOCs was simply wrong. From the beginning of the 
Cold War in the late 1940s until the mid-1980s, the Navy was convinced that in a 
World War III the Soviets intended to fight a “Battle of the Atlantic III.” This was 
incorrect. The Soviet navy’s primary mission was not to attack on the high seas 
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of the North Atlantic but to stay close to home to defend the motherland and, 
after 1973, its SSBNs in maritime bastions. Students of the Cold War U.S. Navy 
have known (from the work of Hattendorf and Ford and Rosenberg, published 
in the middle of the first decade of the twenty-first century) that the top prior-
ity accorded the threat to the SLOCs was a mistake.9 But the focus of these—the 
standard narratives of the period—was on the U.S. maritime strategy of 1981–86, 
and much less on what came before. If anything, the striking, widely recognized 
achievement that the Maritime Strategy represented served to redeem the Navy’s 
previous errors, allowing an attitude of “all’s well that ends well” to prevail.
Many might ask whether attention to the earlier period really is needed. This 
article answers yes, for two reasons. First, these mistakes had major, costly con-
sequences, and you cannot learn from your mistakes by ignoring them. Second, 
if it happened once, it could happen again. And in this case, “once” means again 
and again over decades. When the behavior of a great institution that prides 
itself on intellectual rigor cannot be explained on strictly rational grounds, we 
have to ask why. To ignore this question is to risk unknowingly repeating yes-
terday’s errors today or in the future. This is not a criticism of the Navy’s Cold 
War leaders; they had to make hard choices to deal with a steadily burgeoning 
opponent, in the face of massive uncertainty—unlike the author, who has the 
benefit of hindsight.
NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
How did the notion that the Soviet navy’s main mission was anti-SLOC become 
an idée fixe? Before 1974, there was no national intelligence estimate (NIE) on 
the Soviet navy; its capabilities and intentions were what the Office of Naval 
Intelligence (ONI) said they were, with the fairly uncritical approval of the 
Defense Intelligence Agency.10 For ONI, the Soviet navy, serving an aggressive 
Communist ideology, was as offensively minded as its senior partner, the Soviet 
army. From this perspective, an inventory at one point approaching four hundred 
submarines—a far larger number than defense alone might seem to justify—
could indicate only offensive intent. Its apparent focus was the SLOCs of NATO 
that connected the continents—representing a vulnerability that two world wars 
had shown to be close to indefensible.
However, these inferences, while highly plausible, were essentially abstract. 
Just about all the concrete evidence pointed in the opposite direction: that attack-
ing the SLOCs was, at best, a secondary priority for Soviet planners. Uncertainty 
always attaches to intelligence. (As intelligence professionals remind their con-
sumers, “If it’s a fact, it isn’t intelligence.”) So the accounting below will identify, 
where possible, the topics about which the IC was reasonably confident and those 
where uncertainty prevailed.11 First we turn to individual pieces of evidence from 
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standard intelligence sources, held at the time with fairly high confidence, and 
then to open-source analysis of Soviet military writings, about which confidence 
was low or perhaps nonexistent.
Evidence from Standard Intelligence Sources
In the early 1950s, Whiskey-class submarines dominated Soviet building pro-
grams. Norman Polmar has noted that, in the Soviet categorization of the time, 
these boats were intended to provide direct, “regional” defense of the USSR. The 
“oceangoing” Zulu class formed less than 10 percent of the inventory.12 Soviet 
submarine designs in general were not optimized to perform the anti-SLOC 
mission; many classes had only small-capacity torpedo spaces. The standard 
load of conventional torpedoes for a Soviet diesel submarine was a fifty-fifty split 
between ASW and anti–surface ship weapons. The submarine force did not train 
to attack defended, maneuvering convoys.13 Routinely, only a small fraction of 
the Soviet navy’s order of battle deployed beyond home waters. The supporting 
infrastructure and logistics for distant operations were correspondingly weak.14 
No exercises of significant scale with an anti-SLOC theme ever occurred in the 
North Atlantic, or anywhere else.15 
Anticarrier exercises, however, were a constant feature—often using U.S. car-
riers as training targets. These exercises were especially fraught when the Soviets 
employed them during crises in the Third World—the modern-day equivalent 
of training your guns on your adversary.16 An assessment of intent—indeed, of 
Soviet capabilities—drawn from forces, training, operations, and exercises would 
have concluded anticarrier, yes; anti-SLOC, no. (The Soviets did show great in-
terest in ASW, but were unable to develop capabilities to detect and engage their 
adversaries’ much-quieter submarines.)
Evidence from Open Sources
In the 1960s and early ’70s, analysis of Soviet public statements about military 
doctrine and strategy by Herrick, MccGwire, Blechman, and others showed that 
the Soviet navy was committed to defense, mainly preoccupied with protecting 
the homeland and supporting the seaward flanks of the Soviet army.17 An impor-
tant exception was Marshal Vasily D. Sokolovskiy’s authoritative Military Strat-
egy; its 1962 edition added anti-SLOC efforts as an important priority. However, 
the 1968 edition then downgraded that mission to being an “important” task, 
relevant only in the later phases of a broken-back nuclear war.18 In general, when 
the Soviets did discuss SLOCs, they focused on action not on the high seas but 
against ports of debarkation, often emphasizing the efficacy of mines.
In the early 1970s, open-source analysis at the Center for Naval Analyses 
(CNA) delivered a conclusion that further ruled out anti-SLOC intent. The Soviet 
adversary now had radically new strategic priorities: SSBNs, forming a strategic 
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reserve; the rest of its navy was characterized as “pro-SSBN.”19 Structured and 
trained for the mission of bastion defense, the Soviet navy could not be commit-
ted at the same time to a campaign against the North Atlantic SLOCs.20 
It seems nearly certain that the bastions became operational in 1973. That year 
the Delta I–class SSBN, carrying the Soviet navy’s first intercontinental-range mis-
sile, the SS-N-8 Sawfly, entered service.21 For the Soviets, the SS-N-8 was a gift of 
technology that brought a revolutionary new military use of the sea. The SS-N-8 
(and its successors) became the foundation of the Soviet nuclear reserve.22 
It seems inconceivable that the strategic-reserve/bastion-defense missions 
were established any later than 1973. One would have to believe—as few familiar 
with it do—that the Soviet 
general staff lacked thorough-
ness and foresight, that it ini-
tially ignored possible threats 
to its SSBN reserve, and that 
it only later improvised a re-
sponse to a U.S. ASW threat that it perceived sometime after 1973. As Perse has 
shown, starting as early as 1970, statements by successive CNOs and other USN 
officials had given the Soviets strong reason to believe the United States intended 
to attack their SSBNs.23 In addition, the Soviets were well aware, from their day-
to-day operational experience and their own human intelligence, of the acoustic 
advantage that American and other Western submarines enjoyed over their own.24 
Further, 1973 was exactly the time that Soviet navy chief Sergey G. Gorshkov 
was “announcing” the new Soviet strategy in a series of eleven articles (1972–73) 
in Morskoy sbornik, the Soviet navy’s equivalent of the U.S. Naval Institute Pro-
ceedings.25 Expressing ideas as sweeping as those of Sir Julian S. Corbett and 
Alfred Thayer Mahan, Gorshkov’s articles described a role for sea power never 
before seen in the modern era. The Soviet navy had become the ultimate guaran-
tor of the Soviet state. When a war moved to the nuclear level, as the Soviets be-
lieved likely, their navy’s missiles would be withheld from initial nuclear strikes. 
They would stand as a force in being to deter (further) nuclear attacks on the 
Soviet Union, deal with defeated enemies and erstwhile allies, and dictate the 
terms of the postwar peace. It was a stunning message of self-importance, self-
congratulation—and defiance of the West. Gorshkov was saying, in effect: We 
have our bastions. We know you are going to attack them. We will defeat you.26 
Unfortunately, for many years the U.S. Navy did not get this message. It did 
not recognize the existence of the bastions until 1980–81, when an extraordinary 
breakthrough in special compartmented intelligence (SCI) confirmed in every 
detail the validity of the conclusions that open-source analysts had been describ-
ing since 1973.27 
Intelligence errors centered on . . . understand-
ing Soviet strategic intentions—incorrectly, in 
the case of SLOCs, and too slowly, in the case 
of strategic ASW.
6
Naval War College Review, Vol. 73 [2020], No. 3, Art. 6
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss3/6
 3 8  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
THE RECKONING
In the meantime, in 1974, the first NIE with an exclusive focus on the Soviet 
navy concluded that the Soviets viewed anti-SLOC as a secondary priority, with 
the possible exception of when a war became unexpectedly prolonged. The 
NIE underlined the deep historical roots of this judgment by observing that the 
anti-SLOC mission had exerted no observable influence on Soviet shipbuilding 
programs.28 Because shipbuilding is a process often measured in decades, this 
implies that the anti-SLOC mission never held an important priority for the 
Soviets during the Cold War. This assessment would seem to be borne out by 
Polmar’s observations regarding the Soviets’ categorization of their submarines 
built in the 1950s.
However, the 1974 NIE was silent on the bastions/strategic-reserve missions. 
Indeed, in a discussion of the variety of measures the Soviets might be taking to 
protect their SSBNs, the idea of employing their GPF navy for that purpose was 
simply absent. The IC remained blind to the Soviet navy’s main missions until the 
SCI breakthrough of 1980–81.29 
Office of Naval Intelligence
During this period, ONI fought a rearguard action, petitioning the IC to recon-
sider and reverse the low priority accorded the anti-SLOC mission—to no avail. 
Evidence indicates that ONI continued to pursue this goal even after the (Navy-
derived) SCI breakthrough clearly revealed that bastion defense was the critical 
mission of the GPF navy, one that no other branch of the Soviet armed forces 
could carry out.30 
In 1978, a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)–authored document—of lesser 
standing than an IC-wide NIE—stated that the GPF navy had been assigned the 
mission of defending SSBNs. However, it did not indicate whether this judgment 
arose from new evidence or simply from a revised reading of the logic of the 
situation, as seen from the Soviet vantage point.31 A second NIE, prepared in 
1982, corrected the IC’s error about the strategic reserve and clearly stated the top 
priority assigned to the GPF navy for its defense.32 Tellingly, nothing uncovered 
in the post-Soviet period has given reason to question the accuracy of the second 
NIE’s conclusions.
The question arises: Why did ONI reject the bastion/strategic-reserve concept 
for so long? Indeed, why did it not investigate it as a secondary hypothesis worthy 
of exploration via upgraded collection priority or concentrated analytical focus? 
One possibility is that the conviction that the Soviet navy would surge forward on 
D-day to attack the SLOCs ruled out contemplation of any other possible strate-
gic role for it. Another is that ONI was affected by a totally incorrect suspicion, 
often encountered within the Navy at large, that conclusions drawn from open 
sources, as CNA’s were, could not be trusted, because the source materials from 
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which they were drawn were riddled with Soviet “disinformation.” Disinforma-
tion was and is a real thing (the word entered the English lexicon in the late 1940s 
from the Soviet/Russian dezinformatsiya). But while use of disinformation may 
have been widespread in Soviet propaganda, as it is today in Russia, disinforma-
tion never was injected into Soviet doctrinal writings.33 No information that has 
come to light since the fall of the Soviet Union has suggested otherwise.
However, evaluation of factors such as these does not seem to have played an 
important role in ONI’s attitude toward the bastion / strategic reserve. Rather, the 
reality was more prosaic: insights that CNA and others drew from open sources 
simply were ignored. In 2007, Richard L. Haver, a civilian former deputy direc-
tor of ONI, looking back at events thirty years before, put it as follows: “I would 
also say, and to give people their due, there were people like Bob Herrick, Brad 
Dismukes, and Jamie McConnell . . . who were reading what the Russians were 
saying . . . who told us for nearly fifteen years that we had it wrong. And, frankly, 
the system ignored them.”34 
Navy Planners
If ONI “had it wrong,” so, to a lesser degree, did Navy planners, whose senior 
position always gives them the last word. Regardless of contrary conclusions 
emanating from the IC, fixation with an offensive-minded, anti-SLOC en-
emy maintained its hold on Navy thinking. According to Hattendorf, Admiral 
Thomas B. Hayward (CNO 1978–82), on first being briefed about the bastions in 
August 1981, “found the concepts of Soviet strategy so completely different that 
he expressed disbelief that the Soviets could possibly operate their navy in such 
a [defensive] manner.”35 
However, once the validity of the “new” Soviet strategy was accepted, the Navy 
delivered its riposte with an alacrity rare in large organizations. In January 1986, 
Admiral James D. Watkins (CNO 1982–86) publicly announced the Maritime 
Strategy in the Naval Institute Proceedings.36 His tightly reasoned article described 
a new “war termination” mission for the Navy: by attacking the bastions and put-
ting the strategic reserve at risk, the United States might gain strategic leverage 
over the Soviets before nuclear escalation occurred. In other words, the U.S. Navy 
would prevent its Soviet opponent from achieving its assigned mission, which 
was nothing less than to affect the course and outcome of the war as a whole. 
The Navy itself would take up that role, through achievement of command of 
the (under)sea.
Attention to this extraordinary claim—that the Navy might have made a de-
cisive contribution to the outcome of a World War III—has been muted, for at 
least two reasons. First, the CNO’s article immediately drew sharp criticism from 
advocates of the strategic doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD), who 
argued vigorously that threatening Soviet SSBNs was dangerously escalatory.37 
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A second possible reason is that after announcing the war-termination mission 
the article addressed the SLOCs—with a logic that is difficult to follow. On one 
hand, it stated that attacking Western SLOCs would be, for the Soviets, “second-
ary, at least at the war’s start,” 
and protecting the bastions 
was, for the Soviets, a “critical 
. . . role.” On the other hand, 
it stated that by threatening 
Soviet SSBNs the U.S. Navy 
would “force Soviet subma-
rines to retreat into defensive bastions . . . den[ying] . . . the option of a massive, 
early attempt to interdict our [SLOCs].”38 
In 1986, one could not force an opposing navy to play what has just been de-
scribed as its critical role—the role for which much of it in fact had been created. 
The notion seems particularly inapt when the mission in question was one the 
Soviet navy had been executing for over a dozen years at that point. Nor does it 
seem reasonable to seek to deny the adversary an “early attempt” to execute an 
option described as merely “secondary” in its priorities “at the war’s start.”39 
This criticism is not an idle historical “gotcha.” The idea of threatening the 
reserve to force the Soviets to defend it, and thereby to protect the SLOCs, is 
found even in recent references. In an April 2018 book review in Foreign Af-
fairs, Stephen P. Rosen repeated Admiral Watkins’s formulation.40 This may be 
seen today as just badly told history, but the disjointed connection between the 
two strategic missions has proved enduring. Indeed, SLOC protection held sway 
when the Navy’s Maritime Strategy soon was taken up at the national level. The 
National Security Strategy of the United States, signed by President Ronald W. 
Reagan in January 1987, did not mention war termination. Its announced intent 
to threaten Soviet “submarines” was justified solely on the grounds that doing so 
would “minimize the wartime threat to the reinforcement and resupply of Europe 
by sea.”41 In this way, “attack the bastions and defend the SLOCs” entered the 
national discourse at the highest level. Thus did a depiction of a Soviet adversary 
that posed a threat to the SLOCs march on into the late 1980s—fifteen years after 
the IC had concluded that such a use of the Soviet navy was unlikely.
An anti-SLOC Soviet adversary may not have comported with reality—but it 
did fit other needs of Navy planners to a T. As noted previously, prudence dic-
tates that planners defend their own vulnerabilities. In the abstract—and in the 
popular mind of Americans at large—the United States had no greater maritime 
vulnerability than the North Atlantic SLOCs. Defense of the SLOCs was centrally 
important in dimensions unrelated to the Soviets: showing solidarity with NATO 
allies—especially the British, whose intelligence leaders shared ONI’s views about 
From the beginning of the Cold War in the 
late 1940s until the mid-1980s, the Navy was 
convinced that in a World War III the Soviets 
intended to fight a “Battle of the Atlantic III.” 
This was incorrect.
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the threat to the SLOCs—and supporting the Navy position in interservice bud-
get rivalries. A Navy shaped to defend Western SLOCs drew staunch U.S. Army 
and Air Force support. And the importance of “getting the troops to Europe” 
hardly faced critical doubt on the Hill.42 So, for Navy planners the idea of an 
anti-SLOC Soviet navy was a perennial winner, one not to be relinquished lightly, 
and indeed to be defended—however unsupportable that defense might become.
A MISUNDERSTOOD ENEMY? SLOC DEFENSE— 
WHAT DIFFERENCE DID IT MAKE?
What difference did a misunderstood enemy make for force-employment plans 
and for planning the future force structure? American operational planners were 
planning to employ forces to defend the SLOCs; their defensive script paralleled 
that of their Soviet opposites, resulting in centers of gravity the mutually defen-
sive warring forces foresaw for themselves that were nearly 1,500 miles apart, as 
shown in the figure.
Whatever its overall shape, a Third World War seemed highly unlikely to 
involve a Battle of the Atlantic III.43 Until the Maritime Strategy emerged in the 
The gray diagonals, right, show where Soviet bastion/homeland-defense forces were expected to concentrate; the light gray area indicates where Soviet 
screening forces would seek to deny entry to NATO surface forces. NATO SLOC-defense forces could be expected to concentrate below the GIUK gap 
as shown by the diagonals on the left. 
Source: Adapted from NIE 11-15-82D, p. 17. 
BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC III?
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mid-1980s, the two great navies might not even have been “ships that pass in the 
night.” Employment plans for the U.S. Second Fleet, intended to counter Soviet 
submarines flooding south on D-day, were aimed at a shadow. They were es-
sentially pointless, except for possible use in dealing with Soviet “spoilers” sent 
into the Atlantic on a one-way mission to tie up larger American forces on the 
defense.44
Force-structure plans, which aimed at countering an anti-SLOC Soviet navy at 
the time and into the future, are more complicated to assess. This is because the 
aircraft carriers, while immensely potent, played little role in SLOC defense (or 
strategic ASW).45 And the rest of the Navy’s platforms and systems were inher-
ently multipurpose. ASW and air-defense capabilities developed for one combat 
scenario could perform well in others. Nonetheless, particular investments in 
ships or other systems optimized for convoy defense against massed submarine 
and air attack well may have been misdirected effort. A prominent candidate in 
this regard was the fifty-ship FFG-7, Perry-class frigate program. Billions of dol-
lars invested in it might have been spent better on forces optimized for carrier 
screening, countermine warfare, or other missions, such as attacking the bastions 
or striking ashore.
Some might argue that, despite these errors, U.S. defense efforts nonethe-
less deterred the Soviets from attacking the SLOCs. Such a view does not seem 
logical. There should be little ground for taking satisfaction in deterring an anti-
SLOC “threat” that was essentially abstract. The actual Soviet navy that existed 
during the Cold War had not seriously contemplated attacking the SLOCs; had 
not bought forces for that mission; did not train or exercise to carry it out; and 
was not up to the task, in the highly unlikely event that it tried to accomplish it.
A MISUNDERSTOOD ENEMY? STRATEGIC ASW— 
WHAT DIFFERENCE DID IT MAKE?
In the case of strategic ASW, how history will view the consequences of the 
lengthy delay between the Soviets’ adoption of the bastions and the U.S. Navy’s 
development of plans to attack them will depend mainly on whether strategic 
ASW is seen as a bad idea or a good one. For those in the MAD camp or those 
who simply thought the prospects for success in an antibastion campaign were 
close to nil, the delay was an accidental blessing for the nation. From this point 
of view, the lengthy interval was a period during which the nation luckily avoided 
planning to do something that could have led to catastrophe.
For others, the delay in developing plans to threaten the bastions was a great 
strategic opportunity forgone. Consider assessments from two officials deeply 
involved in the decisions of the time. Former Director of Naval Intelligence 
(DNI) Rear Admiral Sumner Shapiro said that the Maritime Strategy “had a lot 
11
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to do with helping end the Cold War.”46 Former Navy Secretary John F. Lehman 
has gone further, crediting the Navy with a major role not just in “ending” but in 
“winning” the Cold War.47 From this point of view, the nation surely would have 
been served better if the bastion defense / strategic reserve had been recognized 
for what it was soon after it appeared in 1973. The Maritime Strategy—with its 
anti-SSBN component—then might have been developed in the mid-1970s; that 
is, under the leadership of Admirals Elmo R. Zumwalt and James L. Holloway 
(CNOs 1970–74 and 1974–78, respectively), to be perfected under Hayward and 
Watkins.
This historical section must conclude with an important question, at best 
partly answered: If bad decisions were made (SLOC defense) and good/bad ones 
delayed (strategic ASW), did it really make a decisive difference in the history 
of the era? After all, the powerful, multipurpose Navy acquired during the Cold 
War did underwrite the nation’s alliances and successfully countered (this author 
believes defeated) the Soviet navy’s unprecedented attempt, in the early 1970s, to 
carry out a peacetime political mission “to protect the state interests of the USSR 
on the seas and oceans.”48 But success in a peacetime political mission says little 
about likely success in the number one task: achieving victory had there been 
war. And it says nothing at all about the uneven quality of the processes through 
which the Cold War Navy was brought into being.
LESSONS FOR TODAY
Our attention now turns to planning for today and for the future, drawing on 
the history just reviewed.49 The article will look, first, at what Cold War history 
may mean for SLOC defense, and then for strategic ASW.50 It will suggest spe-
cific ways in which repetition of the strategic errors of the Cold War might be 
avoided, and offer concluding thoughts about the broader meaning of what has 
been examined.
SLOC Defense Today
Today’s planning for the wartime security of lines of communication in the 
North Atlantic shows a strong continuity with that of the Cold War, expressed 
in historical metaphor redolent of that continuity. The mission statement of the 
new NATO Joint Force Command in Norfolk includes that the command will 
“help protect sea lines of communication between North America and Europe, 
in a ‘Fourth Battle of the Atlantic.’”51 Recent comments by senior Navy officials 
have made clear that, if there should be a “Fourth Battle of the Atlantic,” it will 
be fought against the Russian navy, which obviously would have to come out to 
fight it.52 
Unfortunately, this line of argument comes dangerously close to echoing the 
errors of the Cold War. The Soviet navy never was coming out to fight, and the 
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smaller, less capable Russian navy is even less likely to do so.53 One presumes 
that the aim of stating, nonetheless, the existence of a possible, even likely, 
concrete Russian threat to the SLOCs reflects non-threat-related objectives: to 
promote alliance solidarity and build political and public support in the United 
States for needed Navy programs. These objectives remain as legitimate as they 
were during the Cold War. However, seeking to promote them by deviating 
from reality-based planning is unlikely to be effective. First, public support may 
be difficult to sustain in the face of criticism that the Navy is distorting reality 
on behalf of the service’s self-interests.54 Second, the time-honored principle 
that the planner above all must defend his own vulnerabilities provides fully 
sufficient grounds for acquiring needed forces and exercising them to maintain 
their readiness.55 The greatest American vulnerability at sea continues to be 
control of the North Atlantic (with regard to SLOCs, undersea cables, and pos-
sible future strategic conventional or nuclear threats to the continental United 
States). Moreover, that control remains an essential condition for the integrity 
of the alliance.
Most importantly, the emerging strategic situation provides an alternative, of-
fensive strategic use for forces that complements and promotes traditional SLOC 
defense. The rapid globalization of the world economy has made Russia far more 
dependent on the sea than in the past for the growth of its economy, in keeping 
with its aspirations as a great power.56 This suggests that the United States and 
its allies should adopt a blockade strategy in response. Neither Russia nor any 
other nation can use the surface of the world ocean except at the sufferance of 
the United States and its allies.57 In this sense, the West can be said to enjoy global 
command of the sea.
In the case of Russia, its assets at sea are mainly economic in nature: those 
engaged in cabotage, international hauling, general commerce for the merchant 
fleet (the second largest in the world, after the Chinese), and liquefied natural 
gas (LNG) and grain exports; a large fishing fleet; and scientific-research ships 
and the like.58 The potential vulnerability of these assets should be exploited—for 
deterrence; for crisis response; or, if war is unavoidable, to fight and terminate 
it successfully. Let us examine briefly two examples of a blockade strategy in ac-
tion—recognizing that blockade is likely to be more effective in “small war” situ-
ations, where the political stakes and the scale of military operations are limited.
First, in peacetime, to buttress deterrence, the West would make clear that 
Russian aggression against a NATO ally will be met with blockade at sea as well 
as with ground and air forces ashore.59 Specifically, whatever the form or timing 
of NATO’s response on land, the United States and its allies immediately would 
deny Russia the use of the world ocean.60 Russia would face a choice between, on 
the one hand, seeking or holding on to territorial or political gains on its western 
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periphery and, on the other hand, forgoing the payoff from the vast investments 
it has made in LNG exports. Second, during a crisis, these sea-denial measures 
might be implemented gradually. It may be possible to calibrate these measures 
to correspond to the intensity 
of Russian threats, including 
ambiguous threats of “hybrid 
warfare,” in both its now-
familiar forms and some per-
haps still to be seen. Through 
marking, shadowing, and the like—without firing a shot—the United States and 
its allies could pose a tangible threat to Russian assets at sea, wherever found.61 
The blockade concept would seem to deserve careful examination as the Navy 
continues to develop plans for the new era. The idea likely has an even richer 
potential against China, which already is heavily dependent on seaborne imports 
of energy, raw materials, and even foodstuffs.62 Navy planning for Second Fleet’s 
AOR obviously must be integrated globally across all AORs. The Maritime Strat-
egy of the mid-1980s might be seen as an exemplar with respect to planning on a 
global scale across all phases of conflict, from peace to war termination and into 
the postwar world.63 Whatever form a twenty-first-century maritime strategy 
may take, it likely should include a blockade component, on behalf of SLOC de-
fense and to exploit its larger potential.
Strategic ASW Today
Strategic ASW is also an obvious candidate methodology for exploiting Western 
sea power today, as it was during the Cold War. This is not merely an abstract 
possibility; the Navy recently let it be known that it contemplates using its sub-
marine force to “deny the bastions”: that is, to attack Russian SSBNs.64 (While it 
would seem reasonable to presume that the stated intention reflects the existence 
of an operational capability to execute it, no such capability was stated specifi-
cally, nor do the remarks that follow here so presume.)
Strategic ASW is a complex subject deserving more extensive exposition than 
space allows.65 But it can be said without qualification that executing the strategic 
ASW mission today would be one of those rare cases in which failure would be 
far better than success. First, success almost certainly would trigger the firing of 
Russian nuclear ASW weapons—to which the United States lacks the capability 
to respond in kind at sea, and in response to which it would have no incentive to 
escalate ashore. Second, it likely would result in nuclear ecological consequences 
of unknown but possibly catastrophic scale. Third—and of the highest possible 
importance—the mortal intercontinental nuclear threat to which successful stra-
tegic ASW would subject the nation would be suffered on behalf of no clear or 
feasible strategic objective.
Employment plans for the U.S. Second Fleet, 
intended to counter Soviet submarines flood-
ing south on D-day, were aimed at a shadow. 
They were essentially pointless.
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The logic of strategic ASW during the Cold War cannot be applied to the new 
strategic situation against Russia. The United States should avoid threatening 
Russian SSBNs in almost all conceivable circumstances. As it did during the Cold 
War, the Navy should take the lead in framing strategy regarding the adversary’s 
SSBNs—paradoxically, no longer to maximize, but today to minimize, the threat 
that U.S. forces may pose. The Navy should seek explicit national-command-
authority approval for the appropriate policy.66 The United States should adjust 
its declaratory policy, its military-to-military diplomacy, and the Navy’s own 
operational behavior accordingly.
In this last respect, Navy developmental and training exercises in the Arctic, 
such as the ICEX series, should be reviewed carefully. Their roots lie deep in the 
Cold War. Propelled mainly by the momentum of technical development, opera-
tional routine, and an established bureaucratic structure, they seem to have been 
continued since the end of the Cold War without conscious attention to their 
strategic effects. But in fact they convey a strong strategic message in the language 
of action: the only possible targets that exist for U.S. under-ice torpedoes today 
are Russian submarines, obviously including SSBNs.67 Faced with this reality, 
Russian planners are likely to prove hard to convince that the United States in-
tends to give their SSBNs a wide berth.68 
Avoiding Yesterday’s Mistakes
It would seem logical to base measures aimed at avoiding yesterday’s mistakes on 
a deep understanding of why those mistakes were made. The author has found 
no satisfactory single explanation, and not one that suggests effective corrective 
measures. Not surprisingly, an intelligence-planning mistake that persisted for 
over forty years had many complicated, interacting causes.69 These must be left 
to others to explore and prioritize.
What does seem certain is that internal Navy self-corrective processes were 
absent or did not kick in with sufficient force. This article will suggest three 
specific process-oriented measures that may hold promise for minimizing the 
chance that today’s planning repeats the Cold War–era mistakes. They are ad-
vanced in a most tentative manner because of the radical differences between the 
Cold War’s binary simplicities and today’s multipolar mix of state and nonstate 
actors, in a milieu of the most rapidly accelerating technological change human-
kind has ever experienced. Let us look first at intelligence, then planning, and 
finally the nexus between the two.
Intelligence. Homespun wisdom long has held that it’s not what you don’t know 
that gets you into trouble; it’s what you’re surest of. Despite its humble origins, 
this maxim suggests a key self-corrective measure: intelligence professionals and 
their consumers should be most skeptical of the conclusions about adversaries 
that the IC holds with the highest confidence and for the longest time. The Cold 
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War experience suggests that a certain bureaucratic inertia attaches to intel-
ligence conclusions at the strategic level. On the intelligence side, analysts and 
the organizations they serve become associated with a particular reading of an 
adversary’s intentions, and so are inclined to resist accepting alternatives. During 
the Cold War this tendency hampered, even prevented, an unblinkered search for 
what the adversary actually intended. Intelligence analysts (and their consumers) 
must remain open to the possibility that the adversary may contemplate novel 
employment concepts, based on alien strategic priorities.
It would be difficult, if not impossible, to establish internal procedures within 
the IC to critically review and question its own “official truth.” During the Cold 
War Richard K. Betts showed how extraordinarily difficult it was to arrive at valid 
estimates in the first place.70 Independent assessment by outside groups is likely 
to remain the best means to confirm whether the IC’s depiction of the adversary 
is valid. The work of the most accomplished planner is likely to be useless if it is 
based on a spurious understanding of the world.
Planning. That planners always must defend their own vulnerabilities is a truth 
that stands without any reference to a potential adversary. There is an important 
difference between saying “I have a crucial vulnerability and I will defend it” and 
saying “I have a crucial vulnerability, and my adversary intends to attack it.” The 
first is always true; the second was not true during the Cold War, nor is it likely 
true today. This seems counterintuitive, because attacking the enemy’s biggest 
vulnerability is what an American planner would do, and it seemed logical to 
expect that the Soviets/Russians would do the same. But the Soviets did not see 
it that way, and for the United States that meant years of misdirected effort, and 
lost opportunity ensued.
Today, the characterization of adversaries should reflect as closely as pos-
sible reality-based planning. It would seem particularly important to avoid let-
ting an abstract vulnerability such as the North Atlantic SLOCs become reified 
into a concrete Russian threat—no matter how useful such a public depiction 
might be.
The Intel-Planning Nexus. During the Cold War, Navy planners and ONI saw the 
same enemy. Planners never had to hedge against Intel’s uncertainties, because, 
when it came to the Soviet anti-SLOC mission, there were none. Planners saw the 
worst case as the most likely one. Thus the Cold War afforded little experience in the 
important business of hedging against Intel’s inevitable uncertainties; nor did the 
period after the Cold War, because of its chaotic strategic landscape and the focus 
on the amorphous threats that arise when the adversary is defined as “terrorism.”
In the current era, the planning process must be especially cognizant of the 
distinction between Intel’s job and that of the planner. The two intersect when 
defining the terms of reference for studies of future-force requirements. This—the 
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crucial first step in any such study—brings together Intel and planners to define 
study objectives, depict the nature of the adversary, and determine which uncer-
tainties are being hedged against, why, and how.71 The enemy being engaged in a 
study of future-force needs might turn out to have much the same shape as the 
one that is driving today’s force-employment plans—but that conclusion should be 
reached only after thoughtful, explicit, and systematic consideration of the matter.
Broader Lessons from the Cold War
The Cold War experience seems to yield two broader messages as well. First, 
the Soviet bastion/strategic-reserve missions were a product of technological 
innovation: the development of an SSBN carrying missiles of intercontinental 
range. It seems quite likely 
that the next revolution in 
maritime affairs also will arise 
from technological innova-
tion. An obvious candidate in 
this regard continues to be nonacoustic detection of submarines, but many other 
technological developments are possible. Second, analysis of open sources seems 
likely to remain the earliest and best means of insight into an adversary’s strategic 
intent. This implies the need to pay the closest possible attention to public state-
ments by Russian (or Chinese) spokesmen about new technology affecting sea 
power. Statements regarding purely technological matters deserve top priority, 
but statements regarding the practical employment of new technology—so prof-
itably exploited during the Cold War—should not be far behind.
The Maritime Strategy of the mid-1980s showed that the Navy—despite the 
errors cataloged in this article—is more than capable of conducting sound, com-
prehensive planning based on a valid understanding of the adversary and of the 
strategic environment. The emerging twenty-first-century version of that strategy 
should combine aggressive offense with judicious restraint: offense, to exploit the 
West’s global command of the sea through blockade, and so to defend the SLOCs 
and gain leverage against a continental adversary; and forbearance regarding the 
strategic ASW mission, execution of which would be a colossal mistake.
The Cold War U.S. Navy, like its predecessor in the first half of the twentieth 
century, was the most powerful the world had ever seen. It cannot be said with 
confidence that, in general over a forty-year period, this came about through ef-
fective intelligence or acutely rational strategic planning. Such shortcomings as 
were experienced in those areas were overcome through massive material invest-
ment, exploitation of technological advantage—and perhaps a measure of good 
fortune. Whether in the twenty-first century—in this new era of great-power 
competition—the Navy can succeed through reliance on superior investment 
The work of the most accomplished planner is 
likely to be useless if it is based on a spurious 
understanding of the world.
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